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Abstract
This article compares views of policy officials and members of community-based collec-
tives on the ideal role of government in processes of community self-organization. By 
using Q methodology, we presented statements on four different governance perspectives: 
traditional public administration, New Public Management, network governance, and self-
governance. Perceptions differ about how government should respond to the trend of com-
munity self-organization and, in particular, about the primacy of the relationship. Whereas 
some public servants and collectives favor hands-off involvement of policy officials, oth-
ers show a preference for a more direct and interactive relation between government and 
community-based collectives. In general, neither of the two groups have much apprecia-
tion for policy instruments based on performance indicators, connected to the New Pub-
lic Management perspective or strong involvement of politicians, connected the traditional 
public administration perspective. This article contributes to the discussion of how prac-
titioners see and combine governance perspectives and serve to enable dialogs between 
practitioners.
Keywords Governance modes · Policy · Q methodology · Community-based collectives
Introduction
Civic engagement around public issues is changing, leading to new forms of community 
organizing, also referred to as ‘self-organization’ in the literature (Eriksson 2012; Edelen-
bos et  al. 2018). As a correction mechanism to the perceived failure of centralized and 
impersonal service provision by government and private parties, communities develop 
small-scale community-based services in which people have a say (Gofen 2015; Healey 
2015; De Moor 2015). As part of a larger cultural and political development, many diverse 
collectives, such as community enterprises and cooperatives, have emerged to complement 
or even substitute professional services (see, for example, Peredo and Chrisman 2006; 
Kleinhans 2017). These self-organizations are new in the sense that they are an attempt to 
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break away from community organizing as either participating in government actions, or 
opposed to government initiatives, but as unrelated to government1. In this article, we use 
the term community-based collectives to refer to groups of citizens that initiate, own, and 
exploit specific collective community-based services.2 As community-based collectives 
establish themselves as independent players in an already crowded and institutionalized 
public field, entering into some kind of relationship with government is almost a prerequi-
site (Edelenbos et al. 2009; Bekkers et al. 2014).
This article: assessing governance preferences of citizens and policy officials
Although we see a growing number of these community-based collectives and, accordingly, 
see a growing attention given in the literature to how they organize themselves (Nederhand 
et al. 2016; Edelenbos et al. 2018), there is very little research on what form of governance 
is actually preferred by policy officials and collectives. As a first step in researching the 
(causal) question of the effects of such relationship, this study systematically examines the 
perceptions on relevant governance orientations among both local policy officials and key 
members of collectives. The central question of this article is: How do policy officials and 
key members of community-based collectives perceive the (ideal) governance relationship 
between government and collectives? Our main contribution is twofold. First, this article 
contributes to the theoretical debate about what governance modes various actors prefer, 
but also how various governance perspectives, and accompanying policy mechanisms, are 
combined (See Levi-Faur 2012; Lægreid 2016). In this research, we identify four govern-
ance modes, which involve different preferences for policy instruments, that are expected 
to attain the general aim of government (Salamon 1981; Considine 2001; Howlett 2009). 
Promotion of dichotomous sets of governance strategies like ‘market versus state’ or ‘hier-
archical versus collaborative’ led to blunt thinking about instruments and their modalities 
which is not helpful for furthering understanding of policy design (Howlett 2014). That is 
to say, administrative practice usually involves the use of multiple tools in policy instru-
ment mixes. However, the nature of these mixes and how behavioral aspects of policymak-
ers lead them to favor one design over another remains understudied (Bressers and O’Toole 
2005; Eliadis et al. 2005; Howlett 2018). Our contribution is a modest, but essential first 
step in developing a more ambitious research agenda on how mixes of normative expec-
tations affect results of community-based collectives. Second, this article provides a firm 
basis for facilitating dialogs between practitioners about these views by providing a theo-
retically grounded exploration on diverging views of governance steering between these 
two groups. A mismatch in normative expectations and attitudes on how the relationship 
between policy officials and community-based collectives should be organized and gov-
erned might have important consequences for the chances of success of collectives (for 
1 Of course, from a historical point of view, these community-based collectives are anything but new since 
early examples of self-organization historically preceded the development of the state-controlled services 
of the twentieth century, and have been present ever since (De Moor 2015; Denters 2016). Contrary to the 
more historical instances of community-based collectives, these ‘new’ collectives establish themselves as 
independent players in an already crowded and institutionalized public field.
2 We do not refer to entire communities that are self-organized, but specific organizational entities, ‘col-
lectives’ organized around a specific function—which also implies that these community-based collectives 
operate within the bounds of regular society, with all the normal rules and regulation.
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example Edelenbos et al. 2009; Nederhand et al. 2016). Hence, the issues of steering and 
intervention are key attributes of effective policy making (Hajer 2003).
To gain insight into the differing perspectives on governance relationships, we use Q 
methodology (Brown 1980), a methodology especially suitable for identifying and system-
atically and scientifically mapping underlying inter-subjectivity on a topic. We first distin-
guish and discuss four theoretical perspectives on governance (“Perspectives on govern-
ance” section). We then explain the research method (Q methodology), how we used it, and 
how we constructed the statements for the sort process, for which we used the literature 
on governance perspectives (“Research design: Q sort statements and respondents’ selec-
tion” section). Next, we analyze the distinction in governance perspectives between the 
two groups of respondents (“Results” section). In the final section, we address important 
conclusions and limitations and consider avenues for future research.
Perspectives on governance
There is a massive literature on the relationship between government and society and on 
governance as the way policy is formed and implemented to influence that relationship and 
achieve public goals. Within this literature, it is possible to distinguish coherent clusters 
that share a specific focus on certain elements or values of governance; these elements 
are not coherent theories, but rather joint perspectives on what is important in governance 
(e.g., Bourgon 2011). Such perspectives can be useful for studying the exchange relation-
ship of government and community-based collectives. For the purpose of this study, we 
have discerned four perspectives on governance that reflect clusters in the literature and 
have proven to be recognizable and relevant in the view of practitioners. We discern the 
following four perspectives: traditional public administration, New Public Management, 
network governance, and self-governance3. We will discuss each perspective briefly and 
present the consequences of each perspective for the relation between government and 
community-based collectives. We do not strive toward a definitive clustering of the govern-
ance literature, but for a lens that can be used to study the perceptions of the mutual inter-
action between policy officials and active citizens. We also acknowledge that the fourth 
perspective (self-governance) is the least well known and least well developed. The per-
spectives can help us to generate statements for the empirical analysis of the perceptions 
of respondents on governance. At the end of this section, we compare the four governance 
perspectives and highlight similarities and differences.
3 We want to emphasize that we present governance perspectives here, so more or less coherent ideas 
on how to govern state-society relations and to form and implement policy. That is not exactly the same 
as coordination mechanism as is sometimes presented in more economic literature (see Ostrom 2010) or 
organizational literature (Powel 1990) like market, hierarchies and networks although the two are related. 
But in governance perspectives much more other aspects are emphasized than in the literature about coordi-
nation mechanism [for instance, in the governance network perspective, as we distinguish it, much empha-
sizes is laid on network management as governance strategy, while this does not receive much attention in 
the literature on networks as coordination mechanism (see Powel 1990)].
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Traditional public administration: safeguarding public values
The first theoretical perspective examined is that of traditional public administration (TPA). 
This perspective focuses on governance as ensuring legal(istic) values, achieving political 
goals, and safeguarding public values, especially equal treatment, legality, and democracy 
(Wilson 1989). Governmental organizations are characterized as impersonal rational sys-
tems that prescribe neutral behavior for policy officials (Weber 1978). Political goals of 
officeholders are favored, and so political decisions guide what policy officials should do. 
Moreover, this perspective emphasizes the rule of law and legalistic values. The presence 
of impersonal and stable rules shields citizens from arbitrariness, power abuse, and per-
sonal whims (Bartels 2013). With regard to collectives, this implies that the interaction 
should take place along the lines of clear regulations. The explicit standardization of func-
tions, processes, and rules makes interaction with the bureaucratic organization perfectly 
predictable (Dror 1968). Hence, public values, such as impartiality and impersonality, 
which guarantee that values of equality, transparency and democracy are not violated, are 
key. From a TPA perspective, safeguarding these public values is especially important now 
that collectives are becoming increasingly prominent in public service provision. There-
fore, to compensate for failures within civil society, government should use policy instru-
ments that regularize collectives that provide services to citizens to ensure that they meet 
those public values of equality and democracy.
New Public Management: governing through performance indicators
The second perspective is that of New Public Management (NPM). It is difficult to provide 
a definitive image of NPM (Pollitt et al. 2007; see Hood 1991; Lane 2000). However, the 
main features of NPM focus on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public service 
delivery through the use of policy instruments that focus on the management of processes 
and systems. In the NPM view, governments decide what they want, specify outputs, and 
then decide which organizations—public but autonomous, nonprofit, or private—can best 
deliver the service (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Moreover, the use of business instruments 
(strategic and performance management techniques and performance indicators) are cru-
cial to any conceptualization of NPM (See Hood 1991). For this idea to work, two very 
important conditions have to be met: goal specification and monitoring capability. Thus, 
public actors have to be able to define goals and translate these into performance indicators 
and actually be able to monitor the implementation of the actors’ activities. In this perspec-
tive, governments thus occupy a superordinate position in relation to collectives that pro-
vide services (e.g., principal–agent relation). Once performance indicators have been set, 
policy officials can take a more hands-off approach to their monitoring role.
Network governance: managing performance through joint interaction
The third perspective is that of network governance. Here, government relates to collectives 
in a more horizontal way, resulting in more intense interactions. Governing takes place 
through the usage of procedural policy tools (Howlett 2000). Procedural tools, like process 
design rules, or arranging interactions, can be seen as techniques of network management 
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Klijn and Koppenjan 2016). They are aimed at altering and 
improving policy interaction, but they do so indirectly by structuring interactions with-
out determining their outcome (Howlett 2018). The governance perspective emphasizes 
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the importance of inter-organizational coordination and quality of decision making (Klijn 
and Koppenjan 2016). In this perspective, public goals and policies are defined and imple-
mented through a process of interaction and negotiation; policy and service delivery are 
achieved in networks of mutually dependent actors. Managerial efforts of policy officials 
focus on activating actors, organizing joint-research meetings (joint fact finding), and com-
posing a set of mutually agreed upon rules of behavior. Whereas the relationship between 
government and collectives under NPM is more strongly contractual and performance 
based, in network governance it is a more interdependent horizontal relationship, with 
emphasis on joint action and facilitating cooperation to deliver societal outcomes.
Self‑governance: fostering autonomy of community‑based collectives
Recently, the perspective of self-governance has been re-emerging (Bourgon 2011; 
Sørensen and Torfing 2007). Naturally, the idea that (small) groups of people can organize 
collective goods without market mechanism or hierarchy has been emphasized by others, 
not the least Elinor Ostrom. Sometimes, this is presented as ‘clubs’ (see Ostrom 2010): 
groups of individuals that create private associations to provide themselves with non-rival 
but small-scale goods and services, but also exclude non-members.
As a governance perspective, thus how it is used in this article, the idea of self-govern-
ance has a long history (for instance, in the nineteenth century, when various collectives 
were established to solve social problems). The key point of this perspective is that the 
dynamics that produce public value start within society and, as such, government relates 
to that (De Moor 2015). For example, government can relate to these initiatives of soci-
ety by letting go, by blocking, by facilitating, or by attempting to ‘organize’ more self-
organization (Nederhand et al. 2016; van der Steen et al. 2016). Thus, governments tend to 
follow and improve self-organization of citizen and society initiatives rather than initiate 
and organize them. Self-governance is not equivalent to a laissez-faire approach to gov-
ernment (see also Rhodes 1997), nor does it imply that self-organization is disconnected 
from government action. Almost all self-organizing activities take place within the bounds 
of government jurisdiction and in regulated spaces and involve interests of other stake-
holders—either in or outside the self-organized community. The essence of this govern-
ance perspective is that because societal actors take action themselves, government actors 
need to relate to these often-uninvited actions (see Sørensen and Torfing 2007). The policy 
instruments appropriate for the self-governance perspective would thus be more restrained. 
They would include things like removing barriers for collectives to function, supporting 
them by providing fast access to public decision making, and maybe encouraging col-
lectives by small subsidies. But essentially governments would stay away from steering 
strongly on the content (which is been done in the network perspective). Although the self-
governance mode of governance contains elements of the network governance perspective 
in the sense that both emphasize a more horizontal type of relationship between the public 
and societal sphere, we observe several significant differences which makes it logical to 
identify them as separate perspectives. In the network governance perspective, the gov-
ernment does have a very active role in linking, collaborating, and co-producing services 
with the collective by intense network management strategies. In the self-governance per-
spective, goals of collectives are emphasized more and government is not very active in 
managing the relation and the output of the service. Thus, in a self-governance perspective, 
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governments are not really co-producing services with collectives but are at larger distance 
only facilitating and reducing obstacles.
The four perspectives compared
The governance relationship between government and community-based collectives can 
therefore be perceived in very distinct ways. When the theoretical perspectives are applied 
to different aspects of this relationship, each mode has a different view (See Table  1). 
Based on the well-established practice of NPM and network governance, in particular, we 
would expect policy officials to embrace these two perspectives. For collectives, on the 
other hand, we expect a preference for the self-governance perspective.
Research design: Q sort statements and respondents’ selection
Q methodology is increasingly applied by public administration scholars in the systematic 
study of perceptions (Durose et  al. 2015). In brief, Q methodology presents a series of 
statements representative of the debate on an issue to the respondents, who are asked to 
sort the statements into a distribution of preference (a Q sort). From this distribution, sta-
tistically significant factors are derived and interpreted (Watts and Stenner 2012). By using 
Q methodology, it is possible to develop a set of statements based on the four perspectives 
identified in Sect.  2 and administer these statements in random order to policy officials 
and community-based collectives to explore whether and how these perspectives operate 
in practice. Hence, respondents are not presented the perspectives, but only the individual 
statements derived from them. By measuring perceptions rather than actual behavior, the 
Q sort concerns the studying of subjectivity. The usage of a statistical tool in combina-
tion with a well-developed stepwise approach makes the method explicit and replicable 
(Watts and Stenner 2012; McKeown and Thomas 2013). We will now explain the three-
step approach that we followed.
Q methodology first requires researchers to comprehensively capture the diversity of the 
debate. There are several ways to establishing the breath of the debate around a particular 
issue (see Jeffares and Skelcher 2011; Watts and Stenner 2012), by using interviews, focus 
groups, policy and/or media discourses, and academic discourses. In this article, we take 
the academic discourse as a starting point (see Durning and Osuna 1994; Klijn et al. 2016). 
This allows researchers to relate the profiles that result from the empirical analysis more 
strongly to existing theoretical debates. We, therefore, started to develop sample statements 
by extracting a long list of statements from our reading of the literature around the four 
perspectives outlined in Sect.  2. By systematically sorting the statements in a 3 × 2 grid 
(see Table 2), we reduced the number of statements while simultaneously safeguarding the 
diversity of the debate. Our approach follows the statement-sampling method developed by 
Dryzek and Berejikian (1993). Across the horizontal axis, the grid considers three types of 
statements that are relevant for examining the relationship between government and col-
lectives: relationships between entities, degrees of agency and governance profession. In 
addition, across the vertical axis, the grid considers two types of statements: definitions 
and prescriptions following, for instance, those of Jeffares and Skelcher (2011) and Klijn 
et al. (2016). To ensure a balanced sample, we retained four statements in each cell. Each 
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statement is inspired by one of the four perspectives, resulting in a total of 24 statements 
(See Table 2 below).
To ensure the compatibility of the statements with the practitioners’ experiences, we 
conducted a pilot study. Before activating the study online, the preliminary Q-set was 
tested ‘offline’ in a face-to-face setting. We instructed two participants from the side of 
collectives (one initiator and one expert working for an umbrella organization specializing 
in community-based collectives) and two policy officials to sort the statements and to list 
the statements that they failed to understand, found similar in meaning, or considered irrel-
evant. We also asked whether they had additional remarks about missing crucial dimen-
sions. Their feedback resulted in several adjustments and refinements of the Q-set.
The second step is to present the study to participants: in this case, policy officials and 
collectives. Most Q studies find samples of between 25 and 40 respondents sufficient to 
establish the number of shared subjective viewpoints operant around a topic (Brown 1980; 
Watts and Stenner 2012). Our P set is composed of 40 policy officials and 40 collectives. 
The participants are working in the field of care and welfare in the Netherlands. We find 
this domain specifically important to study as this policy area is traditionally character-
ized by a strong government presence. Given the demographic of our P set, we decided to 
administer our study online using an application called POETQ4. We asked the participants 
in a corresponding email to let us know when they had difficulties with the Q sorting pro-
cedure so that we could offer additional instructions.
We emailed a link to the online Q sort to 80 policy officials working in Dutch local gov-
ernments. The policy officials whom we approached are involved in policymaking func-
tions in departments of medium-to-large-sized municipalities that focus upon designing 
care and welfare policies. We strived to select policy officials who have direct contact with 
collectives. Around 35% of the participants consisted of professional contacts from our 
network in this sector, while the other 65% were selected by top officials, who send out 
the invitation to the welfare policy department in their organization. A total of 40 people 
completed the Q sort (50% response rate). Despite our efforts to only select officials who 
are experienced in working with community-based collectives, a small minority of policy 
officials indicated that they did not have much contact with collectives. As the differences 
with their colleagues who had direct contact were small, we chose to keep these policy 
officials included in our analysis. Furthermore, we emailed a link to the online Q sort to 95 
initiators of care and welfare collectives in the Netherlands. We only selected collectives 
that are community-based organizational entities initiated, owned, and controlled by citi-
zens and are organized around a specific welfare/care function. They are thus distinct from 
government (and cannot be attributed as co-productions). With regard to the collectives, 
we also selected participants in two different ways to counteract a potential bias. We made 
use of two online databases: MAEX and Vilans. In the case of the MAEX database, collec-
tives need to register themselves. Via the database that is linked to a website (https ://www.
maex.nl/initi atiev en/), collectives make their societal value transparent and can get better 
connected to funds and possible partners or volunteers. This implies a certain amount of 
digital skills on the side of the collectives. The Vilas database consists of 170 care and 
welfare collectives. These collectives were actively spotted and included by the organiza-
tion Vilans itself. For the collectives, this implies that they need to be visible to the profes-
sionals of Vilans to be added to the database. In conclusion, a potential bias exists in favor 
4 https ://steph enjeff ares .wordp ress.com/poetq /.
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of those collectives with good digital and networking skills. In selecting the collectives, we 
also took the phase of the initiative into account as this can influence perceptions regard-
ing governance issues. We only approached collectives that were well established and had 
thus transited the initiating phase. A total of 40 people completed the Q sort (42% response 
rate).
The third step concerns the process of Q sorting. Our participants sorted the 24 state-
ments into seven piles representing the seven degrees of agreement, ranging from ‘most 
agree’ (+ 3) to ‘least agree’ (− 3) (See “Appendix 1”). Subsequently, the respondents had 
to choose between statements, as they were restricted in how many statements they could 
place in each pile. Respondents are not presented with the perspectives but only with the 
individual statements (in random order). With regard to the reliability of findings, there is 
a double-check in the POETQ program, namely (1) by showing the pyramid/sort and ask-
ing whether the participant confirms the order and (2) by explicitly showing the statements 
the participant agreed and disagreed with most and asking for clarification and reflection 
on the reasons why they did so. By these means, the respondents were given the opportu-
nity to reflect on their choice of statements with which they agreed and disagreed with the 
strongest. Almost all participants used these options for reflection: 40/40 policy officials 
and 37/40 collectives. This double-check method enhances the reliability of our findings 
since respondents have to check and confirm their choices. For a more elaborate explana-
tion of the POETQ procedure, see, for instance, Watts and Stenner (2012).
Analysis
We used the software package PQ method to perform two seperate factor analysis 
(Schmolck and Atkinson 2013). Conducting a centroid factor analysis, we extracted four 
factors: two for policy officials and two for collectives. These four factors all satisfy the 
standard conditions explicated by Watts and Stenner (2012), namely that their eigenvalues 
exceed one and that two or more people load significantly on each factor (See Appendix 2). 
Each profile is informed by the loading of between 9 and 21 Q sorts. The degree to which 
participants are associated with each factor is indicated by the magnitude of factor load-
ings. The significance of a loading is calculated on the basis of the number of statements 
in the Q sample (Brown 1980). With 24 statements, the significant loading on the sort is 
calculated to be 0.53 at p < .01. To maximize the number of unique factor loadings, partici-
pants with a loading of 0.53 and above were flagged for a varimax rotation (See Appendix 
3). Of the 80 participants, 60 had a loading on one of the four factors. This is in line with 
what can be expected in a Q study (Jeffares and Skelcher 2011).
Results
From our data, we constructed four factor profiles: two for policy officials and two for col-
lectives. As our Q study is theoretically driven, we interpret the factors in relation to the 
four governance perspectives set out in Sect. 2 (See also Appendix 3).
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Facilitators (21 policy officials significantly associated)
The first profile identifies policy officials as Facilitators. For these policy officials, the role 
of government is in the background: they strongly support the self-governance perspective. 
They believe that non-interference is key to maintain collectives’ feeling of ownership. 
This profile is reflected by the characterizing statement ‘collectives define their preferred 
direction themselves and learn from one another (possibly supported by policy officials)’ 
(s8). To facilitate this process of learning, Facilitators stress the connective role of policy 
officials (s15), thereby embracing some aspects of the network governance perspective. 
Although Facilitators broadly support the idea of self-governance and not controlling or 
hindering collectives (s16), they give less priority to the idea of policy officials actively 
removing obstacles and barriers that hinder collectives (s20) and explicitly taking care that 
collectives are given the freedom to develop in the direction they desire (s24). The same 
goes for the network governance statements regarding actively encouraging collectives to 
open up to collaboration possibilities (s19) and playing a role in composing a set of behav-
ioral rules to let parties know where they stand (s11). Facilitators stress that policy officials 
should remain at a distance to allow collectives to make their own decisions and determine 
the rules of play (s4, s12). Consequently, they strongly disagree with the view, as stressed 
by the NPM perspective, that governments should relate to community-based collectives 
in a traditional or a business-like manner. Participant 25 explained: ‘Then you take out the 
energy.’ Facilitators believe that it is not their job to keep control on what happens within 
collectives (s17) by, for example, formulating smart performance agreements to hold col-
lectives accountable (s22, s6).
Networking Servants (9 policy officials significantly associated)
The second profile identifies policy officials as Networking Servants. Networking Servants 
feel that their main task is to secure such public values as equality, democracy, and trans-
parency in the collaboration process with collectives, as stressed by the TPA perspective. 
Participant 21 explains: ‘It is important to always keep these three values in mind in order 
to remain trusted by residents and authorities. People expect this from us. If we let these 
values go, we become unreliable as a government.’ On the one hand, Networking Servants 
agree upon safeguarding public values (s1) and preventing the emergence of collectives 
from leading to undesirable solutions, such as exclusion and arbitrariness (s13)—state-
ments that resemble the TPA perspective—they strongly disagree with statements from 
the same perspective that policy officials should act upon this in a top-down manner, with 
politicians playing a key role in defining the course of events (s17, s5, s21). As such, the 
Networking Servants’ statement preferences reveal two dimensions within the theoretical 
perspective of TPA: a public values dimension and a top-down governance dimension.
Networking Servants furthermore support statements that come from the network gov-
ernance perspective about involving other relevant parties in the network around collectives 
(s3, s15). Or as participant 15 explains: ‘As a municipality, you have a reasonably good 
overview of what is happening in the city and who are active. By encouraging cooperation 
and bringing the right people into contact with one another, you strengthen initiatives.’
Overall, the orientation of Networking Servants leans more toward the idea of safe-
guarding public values (TPA) and networking (network governance) than toward facilitat-
ing the direction that collectives have chosen (see Facilitators). They, for instance, give 
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less priority to self-governance statements such as keeping at an appropriate distance (s4) 
and not taking over collectives (s16), than the other three profiles. They thus find an active 
stance more appropriate than their Facilitating colleagues. They share, however, the strong 
opposition to NPM control and performance criteria (s6). According to Networking Serv-
ants, this attitude of government harms (and possibly destroys) collectives’ self-organizing 
capacity.
Independents (16 collectives significantly associated)
We labeled the first profile of the collectives as Independents. Independents emphasize that 
policy officials predominantly should take care that collectives are given the freedom to 
develop in the direction they desire (s24). In their perception, this strongly contrasts with 
top-down and managerial government involvement. As collectives are dependent upon pas-
sion and energy, it is crucial to give them the freedom to set their own rules and steps (s8, 
s12). They strongly identify with the self-governance perspective, and in line with this, 
Independents show a clear dislike of political interference, as stressed by the TPA per-
spective (s5). Respondent 35 explains: ‘Political interference can lead to demoralization; 
by involving the alderman, the process gets drawn into the political arena and this often 
results in a very laborious process.’ Other respondents stress the need for collectives to 
remain free of political opinions to maintain openness. Independents are further charac-
terized by a strong dislike of most NPM statements, such as their idea of a business-like 
relationship between collectives and local governments (s22, s6, s10). They feel that the 
achievement-oriented society is preposterous. Instead, respondents indicate that collectives 
are often characterized by a focus on outcomes that are difficult to measure. Respondent 26 
explains: ‘Taking the work that we do into account, the words business and performance 
are two extremes that don’t match. Performance and results are too often crucial in society, 
unfortunately. What we try to do is to break free and provide people with a sense of self-
esteem, utility and welfare. These values are difficult to measure.’
In combining statements from the network governance and the self-governance perspec-
tives, the Independents correspond highly with the policy officials group, the Facilitators. 
Like the Facilitators, Independents take the view that the role of government should be to 
connect relevant parties and facilitate the process if needed (s15). Both groups also particu-
larly dislike statements from the TPA and NPM perspectives. All in all, Independents want 
to be left alone as much as possible.
Entrepreneurs (13 collectives significantly associated)
We labeled the second profile of the collectives as Entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs acknowl-
edge the potential of an active and diverse involvement of policy officials, as long as col-
lectives can define their preferred direction themselves (s8). This profile is characterized 
by the statement (from the NPM perspective) that it is important to reward collectives 
when they contribute to achieving policy objectives (s2). Distinguishing between initiatives 
that are performing well and badly can help to further improve the quality of services. As 
exemplar, key participant 3 explains: ‘It happens too often that initiatives that are already 
performing well are “taken for granted”, whereas huge amounts of time and money are 
spent on new initiatives or badly performing ones.’ This also has advantages for govern-
ments themselves. Key participants indicate that collectives that are performing well save 
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the government money by eliminating and preventing certain problems. This second state-
ment is the only statement from this perspective that is highly supported. For the rest, the 
NPM statements, in general, are rejected or prioritized less by both policy officials and 
collectives. Indeed, Entrepreneurs emphasize that they are not an executive agency of gov-
ernment policies.
Entrepreneurs endorse the statement from the self-governance perspective that policy 
officials should remove obstacles and barriers that hinder collectives (s20), as well as the 
TPA statement on securing values such as equality, democracy and transparency (s1). They 
believe that policy officials should be unbiased in collaborating with collectives. It should 
be about more than who you know and who has a good marketing campaign; rather, it 
should be about genuine impact and content. This profile highlights again the two dimen-
sions within the traditional perspective (the top-down dimension and the securing values 
and equity dimension). Entrepreneurs do not like traditional top-down TPA statements, 
such as checking municipal frameworks (s21), political involvement (s5), and keeping con-
trol of collectives (s17). Respondent 24 explains: ‘A collective often arises from a sense 
of dissatisfaction with the current situation. Therefore, it is not desirable that the “cur-
rent power” acts as judge or jury’ (R24). Moreover, Entrepreneurs disagree with the NPM 
statement on smart performance agreements for collectives (s22). They think that it is not 
only impossible to measure performance such as social cohesion, well-being, and preven-
tion, but also that it is inappropriate.
Entrepreneurs combine statements from the Traditional, NPM (but only one!) and self-
governance perspective. In contrast to other profiles, Entrepreneurs find network govern-
ance less important in their relationship with policy officials. Being rather confident and 
active, they do not need government assistance for building and maintaining networks. 
Namely, maintaining and exploring contacts and networks is one of the defining character-
istics of Entrepreneurs.
Table 3 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the four profiles and their 
connection to the theoretical perspectives.
Conclusion
Our purpose was to explore the views of policy officials and community-based collectives 
on governance and examine the ways in which they differ. This exploration is very rel-
evant in the light of the widespread political discourses advocating that communities care 
of their own local problems and public services, as well as the growth in the number of 
community-based collectives (see Nederhand and Van Meerkerk 2017; Edelenbos and Van 
Meerkerk 2016). The question then is how we should respond to this trend; that is, which 
form of governance is appropriate for—and desired by—the actors involved? To explore 
this question, we used Q methodology in which we presented respondents with constructed 
statements on governance based on four governance perspectives: traditional public admin-
istration, New Public Management, network governance, and self-governance.
Our study shows that there are roughly two types of governance profiles. The first type 
perceives the ‘ideal’ governance relationship as one of ‘pure’ and somewhat radical self-
governance. According to this profile, policy officials should not have direct involvement 
in collectives and keep their distance; the role of government should be to create favora-
ble conditions for collectives. This type of governance is advocated by Facilitators and 
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Independents, and we have found this to be a prevalent profile among both policy officials 
and citizens.
The second type aims for the co-creation of public value and pursues a more direct and 
interactive relationship between government and community-based collectives. This type 
sees an important role for community-based collectives within the broader bounds of gov-
ernment policy. It is the role of government to ensure that the self-organizations remain 
aligned to a broader public interest; therefore, a more hands-on collaboration is preferred 
here. Government is seen as a partner or platform to help realize the societal ambitions of 
collectives. Although Entrepreneurs and Networking Servants advocate this type of gov-
ernance, their precise focus differs. Entrepreneurs believe that their impact on the creation 
of public values may and, in fact, should be rewarded, whereas Networking Servants see 
their involvement more in connecting and taking a collaborative approach. Table 3 shows 
the main characteristics of these profiles.
Limitations of the study
The study does have several limitations. We derived the q sort statements from literature 
on governance. This has clear advantages and strengths (like the possibility to connect the 
resulting factors to the source of the statements, the governance perspectives), but it also 
has limitations. By using theoretical perspectives as our starting point, we run the risk of 
missing additional dimensions of the perceptions of our respondents on the issue. To partly 
obviate this effect and to ensure the compatibility of the statements with practitioners’ 
experience, we conducted a pilot study. Another limitation has to do with the study of per-
ceptions. Although the advantage of applying Q methodology is that it gains insight into 
practitioners’ perceptions, it does not necessarily provide knowledge about how govern-
ance actually takes place in practice. It would, therefore, be good to follow up with com-
parative case studies, in which the different governance perspectives and their applications 
can be studied more in-depth and also in relation to different settings. Another limitation 
has to do with the context. This study was conducted among practitioners working on wel-
fare policies and in collectives with a focus on welfare. Follow-up research could compare 
the governance perceptions in this ‘soft’ sector to a ‘harder’ sector, such as the energy sec-
tor, where talking about performance measurement may be more natural.
Reflections
Despites these limitations, we think we have highlighted an interesting and understudied 
topic in the governance and policy design literature. What becomes clear is that percep-
tions of both policy officials and community-based collectives differ about how govern-
ment should respond to this new trend of self-organization, and in particular, about the 
primacy of the relationship. Whereas Facilitators and Independents favor the relatively 
light governance perspective of self-governance, with community-based collectives 
finding their own way, Networking Servants and Entrepreneurs show a preference for a 
closer relationship in which ideas and policy instruments of all governance modes are 
mixed. While this research highlights interesting differences in the governance approach 
that policy officials and collectives prefer the most, this research simultaneously shows 
that when it comes to the governance approach that is preferred the least, the profiles 
show some striking similarities. That is all profiles strongly reject the applicability of 
performance measurement and strong political involvement. It is clear that despite the 
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more or less ‘distant’ way of governing the managerial idea of performance criteria does 
not resonate at all with both initiators of community-based collectives and with the pol-
icy officials. This should probably encourage thinking about policy instrument mixes to 
arrange the relation between governments and community-based collectives. Mixes that 
combine the management of objectives with mutual learning processes rather than the 
more ‘associations of punishment’ that are connected to the NPM toolkit (see Noorde-
graaf and Abma 2003; Stoker 2006). When we are rethinking policy instrument mixes 
we then should also pay attention to perceptions of most respondents in relation to the 
traditional public administration perspective. Although participants seem to strongly 
support the underlying (public) values and principles such as preventing exclusion 
of groups, they are much more critical about the form in which these are sometimes 
pursued: statements regarding the dominant role of politicians and top-down steering 
were rejected. Collectives, for instance, feared the laborious process when something 
‘becomes political.’ This resonates with the observation of some authors that strong 
political interference regarding content seems to be difficult to combine with new gov-
ernance forms (see, for instance, Klijn and Skelcher 2007). The rejection of political 
interference could point toward another role for politicians that matches the emphasis 
placed by respondents on the more traditional guarantee of fundamental democratic val-
ues (equal access, equal treatment, and so forth) rather than managerial interference. 
Thus, politicians would be more concerned with achieving a level playing field, ensur-
ing that self-organizations do not lead to undesired side-effects and exclusion.
By unraveling governance preferences, this research provides a first step to inform 
and improve the process of policy design in contemporary states (Howlett 2009, 2018). 
This research suggests that the governance of community-based collectives calls for a 
design perspective that mixes the instruments and values of the more facilitating self-
governance perspective with elements of the more traditional, managerial, and network 
perspectives.
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Appendix 2: Factor loadings for Q sorts (40 policy officials and 40 
collectives)
Policy officials Collectives
Facilitators Networking Servants Independents Entrepreneurs
1 − 0.0300 0.4772 0.6148 0.6518
2 0.7244X 0.1059 0.1394 0.5459X
3 0.8930X 0.0513 0.0367 0.8848X
4 0.5036 0.2795 0.1684 0.5650X
5 0.7195X 0.3525 0.3121 0.5991X
6 0.3742 0.5321X 0.7499X 0.3258
7 0.4031 0.5871X 0.1958 0.6416X
8 0.2258 0.4359 0.0310 0.7892X
9 0.6946X 0.3451 0.3485 0.1913
10 0.7625X 0.1799 0.3917 0.7485X
11 0.5642X 0.5161 0.2630 0.6046X
12 0.7371X 0.1947 0.4999 0.5773X
13 0.6646X 0.2258 0.4789 − 0.0361
14 0.3273 0.4699 0.4976 0.2913
15 0.7362X 0.2314 0.5409X 0.5058
16 0.5738 0.5388 0.1717 0.6731X
17 0.3135 0.8259X 0.5349X 0.5118
18 0.4666 0.6510X 0.1755 0.2545
19 0.6785X 0.1164 0.7498X 0.1984
20 0.5971X 0.5041 0.6066X 0.4961
21 0.2932 0.7034X 0.5641X 0.1933
22 0.5375X 0.2318 0.7463X 0.2187
23 − 0.2831 0.4095 0.6236X 0.4487
24 0.3016 0.1680 0.3167 0.7373X
25 0.8166X 0.1117 0.6384X 0.4832
26 0.7144X − 0.2896 0.5587X 0.1078
27 0.4068 0.4961 0.0793 0.4975
28 0.2342 0.6546X 0.5048 0.2828
29 0.6883X 0.1398 0.3781 0.5982X
30 0.4096 0.5585X 0.3197 0.6249X
31 − 0.0246 0.5081 0.7619X 0.4604
32 0.6152X 0.4565 0.5511X − 0.1542
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33 0.0204 0.5261X 0.5311X 0.5060
34 0.6814X 0.1745 0.5136X 0.2811
35 0.6656X 0.4720 0.6924X 0.2492
36 0.6822X 0.2499 0.5000 0.3162
37 0.5649X 0.0158 0.3289 0.3131
38 0.8853X 0.1933 0.0431 0.5235
39 0.0117 0.5463X 0.2649 0.0277
40 0.5066 0.4459 0.7421X 0.2842
Explained variance  % 32 18 23 23
Eigenvalue 16.15 3.63 15.70 2.91
X indicates results flagged for varimax rotation
Appendix 3: Factor arrays for Q sample of statements
Statement Factor score
Policy officials Collectives
Facilitators Networking 
Servants
Independents Entrepreneurs
In the collaboration process between policy 
officials and collectives, it is important to …
 1 … secure public values such as equality, 
democracy and transparency (P1)
0 3 1 2
 2 … reward collectives when they contribute 
to achieving policy objectives (P2)
0 − 1 0 3
 3 … arrange consultations between policy 
officials, collectives and other relevant stake-
holders (P3)
1 2 0 1
 4 … remain at a distance to let collectives 
make their own decisions (P4)
1 − 1 1 0
 5 … let politicians play a key role in defining 
the direction (P1)
− 2 − 2 − 3 − 2
 6 … determine clear performance criteria to 
hold collectives accountable (P2)
− 2 − 2 − 2 − 1
 7 … let politicians and policy officials 
determine, together with collectives and 
their potential partner organizations, how to 
support collectives (P3)
0 1 0 1
 8 … let collectives define their preferred 
direction themselves and learn from one 
another (possibly supported by policy 
officials) (P4)
3 1 2 2
 9 … acknowledge that impartiality and the 
public interest come first (P1)
1 1 0 1
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Policy officials Collectives
Facilitators Networking 
Servants
Independents Entrepreneurs
 10 … characterize the collaboration process 
by a business-like relationship (P2)
− 1 − 1 − 2 − 1
 11 … compose a set of mutually agreed rules 
of behaviour, so that parties know where 
they stand (P3)
0 0 0 − 1
 12 … let collectives determine the rules of 
play, and policy officials help where needed 
(P4)
2 0 2 0
Policy officials should predominantly …
 13… prevent the emergence of collectives 
from leading to undesirable situations (such 
as exclusion, arbitrariness, etc.) (P1)
− 1 2 0 0
 14 … gain insight into the final performance 
and impact of collectives (P2)
− 1 − 1 − 1 1
 15 … connect relevant parties to one another 
and facilitate the collaboration process 
where needed (P3)
2 2 2 0
 16 … not hinder or take over collectives, they 
are self-steering (P4)
2 0 1 1
 17 … keep a good view and control on what 
happens within collectives (P1)
− 3 − 3 − 1 − 3
 18 … encourage collectives to be transparent 
about their performance (P2)
− 1 0 − 1 0
 19 … encourage collectives to open up to col-
laboration possibilities (P3)
0 1 1 − 1
 20 … remove obstacles and barriers that 
hinder collectives (P4)
1 0 1 2
 21 … check that nothing is done that conflicts 
with municipal frameworks (P1)
− 1 − 2 − 1 − 2
 22 … stimulate collectives by formulating 
smart performance agreements (P2)
− 2 − 1 − 2 − 2
 23 … work together with collectives and their 
partners to realize public goals (P3)
0 1 − 1 − 1
 24 … take care that collectives are given the 
freedom to develop in the direction they 
desire (P4)
1 0 3 0
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